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OPINION* 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an employment discrimination appeal arising out of Plaintiff Joseph 
Lewis’s previous employment with the University of Pennsylvania Police Department.  
Lewis suffers from a skin condition, pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB), which has led to 
issues giving rise to his discrimination claims.1  Lewis raises various issues on appeal, 
challenging a number of the District Court’s pretrial, summary judgment, and trial 
rulings.  We will reverse the District Court’s order granting summary judgment on 
Lewis’s claims of constructive discharge and discrimination under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).  We will affirm all other orders challenged on appeal. 
I.2 
Lewis appeals two of the District Court’s summary judgment rulings:  the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Penn on Lewis’s ADA claims for (A) constructive 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Although Lewis raised claims of race discrimination under Title VII in the District 
Court, no Title VII claims are before us on appeal. 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  This Court has 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary. Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 500 (3d Cir. 2010).  “The 
evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be 
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discharge, and (B) discrimination based on (1) failure to provide a reasonable 
accommodation, and (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d). 
A. 
To establish constructive discharge, plaintiffs must show both a hostile work 
environment and that “the abusive working environment became so intolerable that . . . 
resignation qualified as a fitting response.”  Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 
133–34 (2004).  The test is objective and looks to whether “a reasonable person in the 
employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign.”  Id. at 141.  The District Court 
concluded that Lewis had satisfied the hostile work environment element of constructive 
discharge, but had failed to establish a genuine dispute of fact as to whether a reasonable 
person would have felt compelled to resign.  We disagree.   
This Court has identified various factors that support a claim of constructive 
discharge, including being “threatened with discharge,” being “urge[d] . . . [to] resign or 
retire,” being demoted, suffering a reduction in pay or benefits, being “involuntarily 
transferred to a less desirable position,” having job responsibilities “altered,” and being 
“given unsatisfactory job evaluations.”  Clowes v. Allegheny Valley Hosp., 991 F.2d 1159, 
1161 (3d Cir. 1993).  Lewis presented evidence of a number of these adverse employment 
actions in opposing summary judgment.  Among other things, Lewis’s superiors 
disciplined him, altered his job responsibilities, removed him from a preferred assignment, 
                                              
drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).  
Although this case went to trial, the facts recited in this section reflect only what was 
available to the District Court at the time of summary judgment. 
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and threatened Lewis with discharge.  This was enough to create a dispute of material fact 
as to whether a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.  See Clowes, 991 
F.2d at 1161. 
B. 
1. 
Under the ADA, an employer has a duty to provide reasonable accommodations to 
people with disabilities.  See Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 504–05 (3d Cir. 
2010).  The employer can breach this duty by failing to provide an accommodation that is 
reasonable or by failing to engage in a good faith interactive process to identify 
accommodations.  Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 317–18 (3d Cir. 1999).  
In regard to the interactive process, this Court has explained that “if it appears that the 
employee may need an accommodation but doesn’t know how to ask for it, the employer 
should do what it can to help.”  Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 332 
(3d Cir. 2003).  In short, an employee has no obligation to unilaterally identify and 
propose a reasonable accommodation.  See Taylor, 184 F.3d at 315–17.  “[W]here there 
is a genuine dispute about whether the employer acted in good faith, summary judgment 
will typically be precluded.”  Id. at 318. 
The District Court granted summary judgment on Lewis’s reasonable 
accommodations claim based on its finding that Lewis had never expressly requested the 
desired accommodation—exemption from filing medical certifications—that he alleged 
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as the basis for his claim. 3  That is not the proper standard.  Applying the correct legal 
standard, there is a fact question as to whether Penn engaged with Lewis in good faith.   
Lewis submitted a request for accommodation, requesting to “not shave face or 
neck.”  Defendant’s Exhibits in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit CC at 
2, Lewis v. Univ. of Penn., No. 16-cv-05874 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2017) ECF No. 15-6; App. 
152.  Penn was then on notice of Lewis’s claimed disability and the fact that he wanted 
accommodation, such that Penn had a duty to engage with Lewis in good faith.  It is not 
clear that Penn did so.  According to Lewis, Penn issued a flat denial without making any 
effort to communicate with him regarding his needs.  Where there is evidence that the 
employer did not act in good faith to identify an accommodation, “we will not readily 
decide on summary judgment that accommodation was not possible and the employer’s 
bad faith could have no effect.”  Taylor, 184 F.3d at 318. 
Further, “[t]he question of whether a proposed accommodation is reasonable is a 
question of fact.”  Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S., 440 F.3d 604, 611 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, 307 F.3d 160, 170 (3d Cir. 2002)).  Even if Penn did act 
in good faith, it is for the jury to decide whether permanently exempting Lewis from both 
shaving and the certification requirement would have been a reasonable accommodation.  
We will reverse. 
                                              
3 The District Court noted that Lewis had waived the argument, but nevertheless 
addressed the merits.  Regardless of whether there was initial waiver, Lewis clarified his 
position in his motion for reconsideration, and the District Court had the opportunity to 
address the argument—and did in fact address the substance of the argument.  We will 
consider the claim on appeal.  See Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 
240, 249 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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2. 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d), “[t]he [ADA] prohibition against discrimination . . . 
shall include medical examinations and inquiries.”4  Penn’s grooming policy allows for 
exemptions from the clean-shaven policy, but requires that a medical certificate be filed 
every 60 days to support the exemption.  In his opposition to Penn’s motion for summary 
judgment, Lewis identified the 60-day certification requirement as a basis for his ADA 
discrimination claim, citing § 12112(d)(4)(A).  Specifically, Lewis argued that the 
certification requirement was prohibited under § 12112 because there was no legitimate 
business purpose for requiring him to submit a certification every 60 days.   
The District Court did not expressly address this issue in its summary judgment 
order, but in its order denying reconsideration, the Court dismissed Lewis’s claim.5  The 
Court concluded that, while the Penn policy requires certificates, “Lewis has pointed to 
nothing in the record to indicate that getting a medical certificate requires repeated medical 
examinations,” and as a result § 12112 did not apply.  App. 40.  This was error. 
Both medical examinations and inquiries are prohibited under § 12112.  Even if the 
certificates at issue do not require examinations, they still qualify as a form of inquiry.  
Indeed, the EEOC Enforcement guidelines explain:  “Disability-related inquiries may 
                                              
4 “A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries 
of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the 
nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-
related and consistent with business necessity.”  42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
5 The District Court noted that Lewis had not previously raised the argument that the 
certification policy violated the law, but the record indicates otherwise.  Lewis plainly 
raised the issue in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 
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include . . . asking an employee to provide medical documentation regarding his/her 
disability.”  EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical 
Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), July 27, 
2000, available at https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html#N_29_.6  
This definition would clearly encompass the Penn certificate requirement. 
We therefore conclude that § 12112(d)(4) applies to the Penn medical certificate 
requirement.  The District Court did not address whether the requirement could be 
supported by a valid business purpose.  We will therefore remand for further proceedings 
on this issue. 
C. 
Lewis requests various forms of relief upon reversal of the summary judgment 
order.  First, Lewis argues that he should be permitted to pursue his FMLA retaliation 
claim on remand if the constructive discharge claim is reanimated.  Lewis withdrew that 
claim from jury consideration because he was not entitled to damages given the District 
Court’s conclusion that he had voluntarily resigned.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2617; Sommer v. 
The Vanguard Grp., 461 F.3d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 2006).  We have no reason to disagree 
with Lewis’s position, and Penn did not oppose it.  Lewis’s FMLA claim will be 
reinstated. 
                                              
6 While the EEOC guidelines are not entitled to the same deference as regulations, we 
give them “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation[s].”  Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d 
Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 
(1999). 
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Second, Lewis argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the claims that went to 
trial because evidentiary rulings related to summary judgment affected his ability to 
present his case.  A District Court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002).  
“An abuse of discretion arises when the District Court’s decision rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.”  Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re TMI 
Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 666 (3d Cir. 1999)).  In reviewing evidentiary rulings, this Court 
“will not disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion unless ‘no reasonable person would 
adopt the district court’s view.’”  Stecyk, 295 F.3d at 412 (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor 
Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000)).   
It was within the District Court’s discretion to exclude evidence it considered 
irrelevant.  Although evidence related to constructive discharge and ADA discrimination 
may have helped Lewis’s case at trial by making him more sympathetic or otherwise, he 
has not shown that the excluded evidence was relevant to the claims tried.  Nor has Lewis 
demonstrated actual prejudice to his ability to prove the claims tried.  Further, a litigant 
has no inherent right to have separate claims tried together in one case.  See Williams v. 
Rene, 72 F.3d 1096, 1101 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[E]ven if error as to one issue requires a new 
trial, it need not include other separate points that were properly decided.”).  As such, 
Lewis is not entitled to a retrial on all claims.  The jury’s verdict, and the District Court’s 
judgment entered pursuant thereto, will stand.   
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II. 
Lewis challenges four other District Court rulings, which we will address in turn.  
1. Lewis appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion in limine for a 
ruling that PFB is a disability as a matter of law.  We exercise plenary review over legal 
rulings made pursuant to an in limine order.  Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 
793 F.3d 355, 359–60 (3d Cir. 2015).  The ADA defines a disability as: “(A) a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment.”  42 U.S.C. § 12102.  “The question of whether an individual is substantially 
limited in a major life activity is a question of fact.”  Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. 
Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 763 (3d Cir. 2004), superseded by statute on other grounds, 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 6, 122 Stat. 3553, 3558 
(2008), as recognized in Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action Agency, 920 F.3d 182, 
185 (3d Cir. 2019).  Here, whether PFB qualified as a disability under the ADA 
definition was a fact in dispute, the District Court was therefore correct to submit the 
question to the jury. 
2. Lewis next challenges the District Court’s order granting judgment as a matter 
of law in favor of Penn on Lewis’s punitive damages claims.  We exercise de novo 
review of an order granting a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Northview 
Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 88 (3d Cir. 2000).  Judgment as a 
matter of law “is mandated where the facts and the law will reasonably support only one 
conclusion.” Id. (quoting McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991)).  
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A claim for punitive damages in the employment discrimination context requires that an 
employer act with “malice” or “reckless indifference” to a plaintiff’s federally protected 
rights.  Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999).   
Here, Lewis failed to establish that Penn acted with malice or reckless indifference 
to his rights.  In fact, the record is devoid of evidence that Penn had knowledge it may be 
violating Lewis’s federal rights.  To the contrary, there is evidence that Penn did not 
believe PFB qualified as a disability and thought the medical exemption for beards was 
sufficient to address Lewis’s condition.7  The District Court was therefore correct to 
conclude that a reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis 
to find for Lewis on punitive damages. 
3. Lewis also challenges the District Court’s decision not to give a mixed-motives 
jury instruction.  In employment discrimination cases, the question whether a judge 
properly gave a pretext instruction rather than a mixed-motives instruction is generally 
reviewed de novo as a question of law.  See Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 
269 (3d Cir. 2017).  Lewis failed to establish that the District Court erred by giving a 
pretext instruction instead of a mixed-motives instruction. 
Whether a case is a pretext case or mixed-motives case is a question for the trial 
court at the conclusion of all the evidence. Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 
1089, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788 (3d 
                                              
7 Penn also demonstrated motives other than Lewis’s PFB for the disciplinary actions 
taken.  Even where comments were made about Lewis needing to comply with the 
grooming policy, there is no evidence that such comments were based on Lewis’s PFB, 
rather than based on the perception that his beard was noncompliant. 
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Cir. 2016).  Lewis did not pursue a mixed-motives theory at trial.  Instead, Lewis’s theory 
of the case was that all of the discipline at issue was pretextual and was based only on his 
having a beard.  At no point did Lewis concede that he was being disciplined for 
legitimate reasons.   
On appeal, Lewis points to only one piece of evidence that he argues was 
sufficient to support a mixed-motives instruction:  a superior’s deposition statement, 
introduced at trial, that the beard was “the whole reason he was there” for disciplinary 
proceedings.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 47.  This further demonstrates that Lewis 
pursued this case as a pretext case, rather than a mixed-motives case.  We will therefore 
affirm the District Court’s order denying the mixed-motives instruction. 
4. Lewis’s final claim is that the District Court erred in its sanction order 
responding to attorney misconduct.  The decision to impose sanctions is a matter 
entrusted to the discretion of the District Court.  Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 653 F.3d 299, 
303 (3d Cir. 2011).  The District Court was in the best position to assess counsel’s 
conduct and the need for sanctions in the context of the trial as a whole.  Here, the Court 
opted to give “admonitions all around.”  App. 415.  That decision was fully within the 
Court’s discretion, and did not constitute error. 
III. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the District Court’s judgment in 
part and remand for additional proceedings on Lewis’s claims of constructive discharge, 
FMLA retaliation, ADA discrimination for failure to provide a reasonable 
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accommodation, and ADA discrimination based on a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).  
We will otherwise affirm.  
